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I.

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 34(c) and 35(c), Appellant City of Middleton ("City")
submits this Reply Brief in rebuttal to the arguments by Martin and Patricia Galvin (the "Galvins")
in their Respondent's Brief filed on June 13, 2018.

The City restates and incorporates the

Statement of Facts and the Course of Proceedings in its Appellant's Opening Brief here. As set
forth in the Appellant's Opening Briefand this Reply Brief, the District Court's grant of summary
judgment should be reversed.

II.

ARGUMENT

A. Material Issues Of Fact Exist That Should Have Precluded Summary Judgment Granted.

Galvins argue that summary judgment was proper in this because it was a bench trial rather
than a jury trial and therefore with a bench trial the court is not required to draw inferences in favor
of the non-moving party. See Respondent's Briefpp. 18-19. Applying that rule of law to this case,
Galvins argue that their application to rezone their property to a golf course does not lead to an
inference that they intended to abandon the prescriptive easement. The Galvins misapply the
summary judgment standard where issues are tried on a bench trial.
The Galvins quote various decisions from this Comt that state, "When an action will be
tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the
party opposing a motion for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the
most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." See e.g. Loomis v.

City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434, 436-37, 807 P.2d 1272, 1274-75 (1991) (underlining added). The
City agrees with that quoted language but disagrees with the Galvins' argument that this is the full
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standard for summary judgement where the action involves a bench trial. What happens when
there are "controverted" facts? This Court's answer in prior decisions is summary judgment is
improper and should not be granted.
In Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219,222,220 P.3d 575, 578 (2009), this Court explained
that "[w]hen an action will be tried before a court without a jury, the court may, in ruling on the
motions for summary judgment, draw probable inferences arising from the undisputed evidentiary
facts. Drawing probable inferences under such circumstances is permissible because the court, as
the trier of fact, would be responsible for resolving conflicting inferences at trial."

However,

where controverted facts exist, that is "reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or
draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented, then summary judgment is improper."

Id. (underlining added) citing Boise Tower Assocs., LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 778, 215
P .3d 494, 498 (2009). "Conflicting evidentiary facts, however, must still be viewed in favor of the
nonmovingparty." Id citing Banner Life Insurance Co., v. Mark Wallace Dixon Irrevocable Trust,
147 Idaho at 124,206 P.3d at 488 (2009).
In this case, the Galvins' attempt to minimize the significance of their actions that they
took to get their property rezoned by arguing that their application to rezone their property is not
enough to create a material issue of fact. Despite this matter being tried without a jury, the
evidence submitted by the City on summary judgment raised conflicting evidentiary facts that the
Galvins were going to stop .faming their property and therefore the purpose for the agricultural
prescriptive easement would no longer exist. Thus, summary judgment should not have been
granted. Those actions included Mr. Galvin writing to the Canyon County Planning and Zoning
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stating that his intent is to "convert 260 acres of agricultural and dry grazing ground ... to
approximately 120 lots and a 18 hole golf course." See Exhibit F to Villegas Ajfd., R. 183-186.
~mportantly, Mr. Galvin stated in a letter to Canyon County, that he no longer desired to farm his
land:
This ground has been in my family for approximately 122 years I've farmed here for
approximately fifty years and due to my health and age I no longer have the desire to farm
and I feel this will be a good transition for the city of Middleton and the surrounding area.

Id (underlining added). The Galvin application even stated that "[a]ll farm operations will stop
and land will be converted to residential use." See Exhibit C to Villegas Affd. at p. 3, ,r 9, R. 155.
Canyon County entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law granting the rezone and
conditional use permit for the golf course. In its Findings and Conclusions, Canyon County made
a specific finding that "Martin Galvin has farmed the land for approximately fifty (50) years and
is no longer able to farm the land." See Exhibit G to Villegas Affd., R. 197.
Galvins' Reply Brief fails to address or discuss why those actions do not draw conflicting
inferences and/or raise material issues of fact that the Galvins' present intent was to no longer farm
their property thereby destroying the purpose of the prescriptive easement. Reasonable minds
could reach different conclusions whether the Galvins no longer needed the easement because they
were giving up farming their property. "The acts claimed to constitute the abandonment of an
easement must show the destruction thereof, or that its legitimate use has been rendered impossible
by some act of the owner thereof, or some other unequivocal act showing an intention to
permanently abandon and give up the easement." O'Brien v. Best, 68 Idaho 348, 357-58, 194 P .2d
608, 613-14 (1948); see also Chatham v. Blount Cty., 789 So. 2d 235,241 (Ala. 2001) (Alabama
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Supreme Court held that owner of an express easement as a railroad right-of-way had abandoned
easement when the owner sold the rails, crossties, and track material, rendering impossible the use
of the easement as a railroad right-of-way or for railroad purposes).
Rather than address the specific acts they took during the two-year rezone process City's
arguments described above, the Galvins attempt to draw this Court's attention away from those
acts and focus this Court's attention on the allegation that they continued to farm their property
after the rezone and even had they turned their property to a golf course, the Galvins would have
still have used the easement. Both arguments are unavailing.
First, abandonment looks at the present intent to abandon, which is defined as an intent
" ... to leave, quit, renounce, resign, surrender, relinquish, vacate, discard. Abandon denotes the
absolute giving up of an object, often with the further implication of its surrender to the mercy of
something or someone else." Carrington v. Crandall, 65 Idaho 525, 147 P.2d 1009, 1011-12
(1944) quoting Webster's New Intemat'l. Dictionary, 1941. "Abandonment is a matter of intent,
coupled with corresponding conduct; thus a question of fact." O'Brien v. Best, 68 Idaho 348,357,
194 P.2d 608, 613 (1948). Here, it is irrelevant what the Galvins did after-the-fact from the date
they obtained the rezone changing the use of their property. Anyone can change their mind afterthe-fact. In fact, it is undisputed that beginning around the mid-1990s, Mike Wagner began
farming the Galvin Property, and the Galvins stopped personally farming. See R. 70, ,r 25. After
the economy and the Galvins' financial situation did not permit them to immediately start
development of the golf course, the Galvins had sufficient time to hedge against potential financial
loss by continuing the "sharecropping arrangement" with Mike Wagner, who continued to farm
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the Galvin Property. Compare R. 225,

,r,r

4-5, with R. 121,

,r,r

6-7. Thus, the analysis of

abandonment in this case should focus on the Galvins' intent during that two-year timeframe they
worked to get the rezone not what the property was used for after the rezone.
Galvins' argument that they would still use the easement if the property was a golf course
(Respondent's Brief pg. 21) is likewise unavailing on the issue of abandonment. The evidence on
summary judgment was the purpose of the prescriptive easement was for an agricultural use.
Along those lines, Martin Galvin argued that the dimensions of the prescriptive easement must be
wide enough to accommodate his agricultural use including the use of a farming combine. It is
ridiculous to say that had the property been converted to residential homes and a golf course, the
Galvins would still be using the prescriptive easement for agricultural uses such as driving a
combine across a golf course and subdivision streets. There was also no evidence produced that
the irrigation ditch would remain in the same location once the property was developed into a golf
course.
B. Canyon County's Grant of Comprehensive Plan Amendment and Rezone Were Sufficient
to Meet the "Further Acts" Requirement of Abandonment.

The Galvins argue that the Comprehensive Plan Amendment and Rezone they obtained to
turn the property into a golf course was not sufficient to meet the "further acts" requirement for
abandonment because the Canyon County's Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law allegedly state
that the "rezone itself recognizes that it is for rezoning only and does not represent the current ·of
future property or easements." See Respondent's Briefpg. 22. The Galvins however misconstrue
the County's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order because the language they are
relying on is contained within an exhibit to the Order. See (R. 206, 208 and 210). That exhibit is
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merely the survey submitted by the Galvins' surveyor Tealy for their property. The note in the
survey (R. 206, 208 and 210) however is not an official finding or decision from Canyon County;
the use of the exhibit was to identify the metes and bounds description of the Galvin property
sought to be rezoned.
Galvins also argue that during their application to rezone their property, they never made
representations to the county that they intended to abandon the prescriptive easement or irrigation
ditch. That is not the case. In addition to the Tealy Survey attached to the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order as an exhibit, there are two maps, ohe hand drawn (R. 212) and the
other a scale map (R. 213). Both maps are attached to the back of this Reply Brief On both maps,
the Galvins do not identify the prescriptive easement they claim to have. In fact, on the hand
drawn map, we see a roadway, Old Middleton Road, traverse though the Galvin property and turn
into Willis and stop immediately in front of the Hazel Robinson property. Neither map shows that
the Galvins had or were keeping an easement/roadway through the Robinson property.
On the date the requested Comprehensive Plan change/amendment and zoning ordinance
was passed, the Galvins completed their clear, unequivocal and decisive act to abandon the
easement because they obtained a valid protectable property right that could not be changed or
taken away by the government without due process. See e.g. Jasso v. Camas Cty., 151 Idaho 790,
796, 264 P.3d 897, 903 (2011) (held: "due process rights are substantial rights."); Terrazas v.

Blaine Cty. ex rel. Bd. ofComm'rs, 147 Idaho 193,198,207 P.3d 169, 174 (2009) (held: the right
to develop one's property is a substantial ri~ht). At any time during the two-year process to rezone
their property from agriculture to a subdivision and golf course, the Galvins could have withdrawn
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their application. The date Canyon County amended its Comprehensive Plan and simultaneously
amended its zoning ordinance to rezone the Galvins' property to rural residential and a golf course
solidified their position that "[ a]11 farm operations will stop and land will be converted to
residential use" as stated in their application. See Exhibit C to Villegas Affd. at p. 3, ,r 9, R. 155.
As such, the cessation of farm operations destroyed the purpose for the agricultural prescriptive
easement.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED GRANTING ATTORNEY FEES.

The Galvins argue that the District Court properly awarded attorney fees to the Galvins
because it applied the standard under Idaho Code § 12-117 whereas the City argued against
granting fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 as if the standard is different which is not the case. Idaho
Appellate Courts have equated the quoted language from § 12-117 to mean the same as the
frivolous standard ofldaho Code§ 12-121. "The standard for awarding attorney fees under Idaho
Code section 12-121 is essentially the same as that under Idaho Code section 12-117." Coeur

D'Alene Tribe v. Denney, 161 Idaho 508, 387 P.3d 761, 778-79 (2015). "This Court has stated
that '[b]oth I. C. § 12-11 7 and § 12-121 permit the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party
if the court determines the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation.' Nation v. State, Dep't of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 194, 158 P.3d 953,970
(2007)." Id.
Next, the Galvins argue that the District Court correctly applied of the holding of Turner

v. Cold Springs Canyon Ltd P'ship, 143 Idaho 227,230, 141 P.3d 1096, 1099 (2006) to find that
the City's defense regarding the prescriptive easement's dimensions were frivolous. That Turner
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holding is factually and procedurally distinguishable from this present case and therefore not
applicable. The Turner court awarded attorney fees on appeal under§ 12-121 holding:
The Turners request attorney fees on appeal under I.C. 12-121. Under I.C. 12-121,
attorney fees are appropriate if the appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation. The Turners contend that this appeal was brought frivolously
because Cold Springs improperly presented new issues and argument in the motions
following the summary judgment order and on appeal and because Cold Springs did
not provide proper legal authority to support its claims on appeal. At the summary
judgment stage, Cold Springs' sole contention was that no easement existed. After
losing at summary judgment. Cold Springs argued that an express easement existed and
then introduced new issues and arguments. These new issues are the only issues on
appeal. This creates a difficult situation because the attorneys on appeal have presented
issues that would be debatable had they been argued in the district court by prior
counsel. Nonetheless, the burden has fallen on the Turners to defend an appeal that
under this record is unreasonable. They are entitled to attorney fees. Cold Springs could
have argued these issues in the alternative at the summary judgment stage. It did not.
The issues are not proper for appeal. Consequently, Cold Springs brought this appeal
frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation.
Turner v. Cold Springs Canyon Ltd. P'ship, 143 Idaho 227, 230, 141 P.3d 1096, 1099 (2006)

(underlining added). Attorney fees were therefore awarded because Cold Springs raised new
issues and arguments that should have been raised previously.
In this case, the Galvins' Memorandum in Support ofSummary Judgment (R. 95-111) never
addressed what the dimensions of the -prescriptive easement should be. It was _the City in its
Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment who first raised the

argument that material issues of fact existed regarding the prescriptive easement's dimensions.
Roman numeral III of the City's summary judgment brief was titled "There Are Genuine Issues
Of Pact Establishing The Dimensions Of The Prescriptive Easement." See (R. 133). Even after
the City raised this issue. The Galvins submitted their Reply Memorandum In Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment (R. 224) and a Supplemental Declaration ofMartin C. Galvin In Reply to
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Opposition ofMotion for Summary Judgment (R. 224) but still failed to put forth evidence of the
easement's dimensions.
The Turner v. Cold Springs is distinguishable from this case because unlike Cold Springs
who raised new issues after summary judgment was granted, the City raised its defenses during
summary judgment arguments and raised this issue once again in its Motion for Reconsideration
(R. 308) and Memorandum In Support of Reconsideration (R. 310). If the Galvins were certain
that they submitted evidence on summary judgment regarding the dimensions of the easement they
would not have needed to file a Motion to Alter of Amend Judgment (R. 340) and a proposed

Amended Judgment (R. 367) that included a survey of the prescriptive easement's dimensions.
The District Court's holding that the City "failed to present any evidence of the easement's
dimensions prior to or at summary judgment stage in spite of the Galvins' request for twenty feet
to accommodate a combine header," See Memorandum Decision and Order for Attorney Fees and

Costs (R. 518) and Order for Attorney Fees and Costs (R. 559), is wrong and an abuse of
discretion.
For the sake of brevity, the City restates and incorporates its arguments in Appellant's Brief
herein, giving the reasons why the district court erred awarding attorney fees against the City.

- IV.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED AGAINST THE
CITY.
The Galvins argue that attorney fees should be awarded against the City because the appeal

is frivolous. Citing to State v. Hudson, 162 Idaho 888,894,407 P.3d202, 208 (2017), the Galvins
argue that the City has presented the same argument without providing any additional persuasive
law or bringing and therefore the appeal is frivolous. See Respondent's Briefpg. 27. Therefore,
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the Galvins contend, ''The City is simply rehashing its same old arguments. There is nothing new
here." Id
Contrary to the Galvins' position, the City has cited to additional persuasive case law on
appeal and provided compelling arguments why material issues of fact exist in this case. For
example, the Appellant's Brief cites to the holding of Chatham v. Blount Cty., 789 So. 2d 235, 241
(Ala. 2001) to argue that reasonable minds might reach different conclusions whether Mr. Galvin
no longer needed the easement because he was giving up farming his land thereby destroying the
purpose for the prescriptive easement. See Appellant's Briefpg. 25. In Chatham the Alabama
Supreme Court held that owner of an express easement for a railroad right-of-way had abandoned
that easement when the owner sold the rails, crossties, and track material, rendering impossible
the use of the easement as a railroad right-of-way or for railroad purposes. Id.
In addition to raising additional persuasive legal authority, the City has presented argument
by directing this Court to the record on summary judgment as well as transcripts of the hearings to
show that

material issues of fact existed in this case whether the Galvins' abandoned the

agricultural prescriptive easement when they obtained land use approvals to rezone their property
to a subdivision and golf course. It cannot be said that the City's arguments on appeal were
frivolous.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, and the reasons set forth in Appellant's Brief, the City
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment and
award of attorney's fees.
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DATED this _j_ day of
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